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MARKETS AND FALSE HIERARCHIES:
1
SOME PROBLEMS IN TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
1. INTRODUCTION
Transaction cost economics, or the markets and hierarchies 
framework, has emerged in recent years as an important new 
approach for dealing with a variety of problems in industrial 
organisation. Although Coase (1937) provided an early statement 
of the role of transaction costs in encouraging firm organisation 
to replace market exchange in certain circumstances, the 
development of transaction cost economics as a coherent and 
systematic industrial organisation framework did not take place 
until the 1970's. The rediscovery, development, and refinement 
of transaction costs as a possible analytical tool is due in 
large part to Oliver Williamson, whose outline of the framework 
is contained in three works. The initial statement, Markets and 
Hierarchies (1975, henceforth M & H) provided an integration and 
synthesis of some earlier applications of transaction cost 
economics in areas such as internal labour markets, vertical 




























































































organisation. Recently, his Economic Institutions of Capitalism 
(1985, henceforth E.I.S.) has further extended the boundaries of 
transaction cost economics, remaining broadly consistent with M & 
H and integrating much of its earlier arguments in the text. In 
addition, Economic Organisation (1986, henceforth E.O.) is a 
selected set of essays, some in transaction cost cost economics 
and some from an earlier period in Williamsons1 work. For our 
purposes, E.I.S. may be taken as a definitive and current 
statement of Williamson's approach to economics, though both of 
the other works extend the analysis in significant respects.
It is a tribute to the central importance of Williamson's 
work in this growing tradition that a critique of transaction 
cost economics can treat his texts as definitive. While other 
writers (often in areas outside industial organisation) have 
utilised the framework, it is to a large extent inextricably 
associated with his analysis. Consequently, we shall treat these 
texts as representative of the transaction cost approach.
With this in mind, the main purpose of this paper can be 
introduced. It is argued below that transacton cost economics as 
presently constituted displays critical flaws that may impede and 
even prevent the realisation of its ambition of providing a 
useful explanatory framework in industrial organisation. Three 
crucial words above are 'as presently constituted.' We shall 
argue that there are specific and clear deficiencies in 




























































































analysis. Directions for modifying and developing the framework 
are suggested. The central theme of our paper is that
transaction cost economics cannot yet be properly regarded as a 
fully developed 'markets and hierarchies' approach. The 
transaction cost perspective emphasises exchange based 
contractual relations to the detriment of other possible 
relationships, and consequently provides a distorted 
interpretation of hierarchical resource allocation. These 
problems are exacerbated by the absence of a theory of decision­
making in transaction cost economics.
As well as detailing possible analytical deficiencies in the 
transaction cost tool kit, we shall also consider examples of how 
they may lead to problems and difficulties in arguments built on 
them.
We shall start with a brief outline of the transaction cost 
framework in the next section before suggesting an agenda for 
analysis of transaction cost economics in section 3. The agenda 
is coiaposed of five elements; markets, products, decision-making, 
technological change and prices. In sections 4 to 8 we consider 
each item in turn from the perspective of how it is dealt with in 
transaction cost economics. In the final section we summarise 
the major arguments of this article before suggesting directions 




























































































2. THE TRANSACTION COST FRAMEWORK
Although many complex and sophisticated edifices can and 
have been built on transaction cost principles, its foundations 
are simple and straightforward. Three concepts form the basis of 
transaction cost analysis; bounded rationality (cognitive and 
language limits on individuals' abilities to process and act on 
information), asset specificity (specialisation of assets with 
respect to use or users), and opportunism (self interest seeking 
with guile).
If bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism 
co-exist, then it may pose efficiency problems for the market 
mechanism. Interestingly, if any of the three conditions do not 
exist, then the market mechanism may still allocate resources 
effectively. Firstly, if there are no bounds on rationality, all 
future contingencies may be anticipated and incorporated into 
contractual agreements. Unbounded rationality excludes the 
possibility of unexpected events not allowed for in the contract, 
and so both or all parties may settle all problems from the 
outset. Contract may therefore be relied on to settle issues 
arising from problems of opportunism or asset specificity. 
Secondly, if asset specificity does not exist, then bounded 
rationality and opportunism are not serious problems. If assets 
can be easily transferred in and out of alternative uses then 




























































































aot have continuing or lasting effects. Finally, if opportunism 
is not a problem then asset specificity and bounded rationality 
are not serious impediments to the working of the market 
mechanism. For example, if the transacting world is populated by 
saints rather than opportunists, a simple promise to deal with 
future unexpected problems and surprises in a mutually fair and 
equitable manner should be sufficient to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the market mechanism (EIS PP 30-32).
Therefore, if any one of these conditions - bounded 
rationality, asset specificity, opportunism - does not exist, the 
market can be relied upon to deal with resource allocation 
problems smoothly and effectively. At first sight, this would 
appear to create a fairly strong case in favour of the apparent 
power and flexibility of the market mechanism. However, 
Williamson argues persuasively that situations in which all of 
these conditions are present are significant and pervasive 
problems in economic organisation. In those circumstances the 
market imperative is replaced by a broader imperative to; 
."Organise transactions so as to economise on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism." (EIS P32, italics in original).
At this point the analysis evolves into comparative analysis 
of alternative governance structures for organising transactions. 
For any given economic activity there usually exists a wide range 




























































































organised, ranging from centralised hierarchies at one extreme 
and traditional market contracting at the other, with mixed or 
intermediate modes in between. The issue then becomes one of 
which institutional form constitutes the most efficient in terms 
of organising the specific activity.
The comparative basis of the analysis involves the 
recognition that all forms of economic organisation are likely to 
encounter problems in handling and processing the information 
involved in resource allocation if all these conditions of 
bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism are 
present. For example, market transactions may involve expensive 
legal contracting, time-wasting haggling, and costly monitoring, 
all of which may constitute transaction costs. One solution may 
be to internalise the transaction and so reduce transaction 
costs. Internal monitors such as supervisors or boards of 
directors are likely to be better informed (through experience 
and improved access to better quality and quantity of 
information) and in cases where individual performance can be 
ascertained, have available a more immediate direct range of 
rewards and penalties (bonus/promote/fire) than may be available 
in the market place (yell down the telephone/sue ). Therefore, 
internal organisation of the transaction may be more efficient 
than market contracting in some circumstances to the extent it 
reduces bounded rationality problems and curbs opportunism. 




























































































expansion of corporate boundaries through Merger, takeover or 
internal expansion.
However such internalisation is unlikely to be costless. In 
practice, enlargement of the bureaucracy through internalisation 
is likely to lead to impairment of incentives (EIS,PP 131-62). 
Markets involve what Williamson calls high-powered incentives 
such as profits and losses. These incentives may be blunted or 
sacrificed by internalisation. Promises to act efficiently made 
by internal actors in the resource allocation process are not 
costlessly enforceaDie. Tne Dureaucracy may De more permissive 
and forgiving with respect to inefficient activity than is the 
impersonal world of the market place. Williaiuson argues that 
efficiency criteria will tend to encourage the appearance and 
continuance of the least cost alternative in different cases. 
Comparative analysis of firms and markets also permits the 
analysis to be extended into related areas of state intervention 
such as antitrust policy and allocation of franchises.
These concepts and principles constitute the basic 
foundations of transaction cost economics. In the next section 
we shall introduce a set of concepts that may help illuminate 



























































































3. THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION AGENDA
In Kay (1984) it was argued that the neoclassical agenda was 
effectively limited to manifestations and refinements of 
essentially one decision problem, the optimal product-market 
price. Issues in competition, monopoly, externality, public 
goods, and factor markets can be regarded as applications and 
extensions of this basic problem. This perspective on the 
neoclassical agenda proved useful not only in identifying 
difficulties arising from this highly limited and selective 
agenda, but in analysing the context in which recent alternative 
contributions could be placed. We shall see it may also be 
useful in analysing the potential contribution to be made by 
transaction cost economics.
We shall extend our description of the agenda here to take 
into account an aspect that was ignored in the earlier analysis, 
the element of time. The neoclassical agenda could more 
accurately be decribed as being concerned with short (or long) 
run optimal product market price. This agenda may in turn be 
split up into its five components. The short/long run item 
emphasises that decisions may be classified in terms of whether 
or not all relevant costs are variable; the optimal criterion 
means that decisions can be expressed as problems in constrained 
maximisation; individual products form the basic element of 




























































































exchange is the basic form of governance; and price is sufficient 
information for decision-making purposes.
In fact, each of the five items can and has been criticised 
as involving a partial or limited interpretation of the resource 
allocation process. Firstly, the short/long orientation 
concentrates on classes of resource allocation decisions 
associated with conditions of static technology. Innovation is 
treated exogenously in this perspective. Schumpeter (1954) was 
one of the first economists to emphasise the significance of the 
very long run in economic and industrial development, but his 
theme has been taken up by a number of others in recent years, 
with Nelson and Winter (1982) representing the high water mark 
in this tradition at the moment. Secondly, the concept of 
optimality has been criticised by economists from a variety of 
perspectives, such as the Austrian, post-Keynesian, institutional
2
and behavioural schools. Informational considerations usually 
enter explicitly or implicitly into these analysts critiques, 
with optimality typically being regarded as an inapplicable 
concept in conditions where bounded rationality problems are 
significant. Thirdly, the role of products as the basic building 
blocks in the analysis of the firms has been challenged by those 
who take the view that the firm can be better regarded as a 
bundle of resources rather than as an aggregation of products. 
Penrose (1959) was the first to systematically develop this line 



























































































theory has been argued to be an inadequate basis for analysis of 
economic organisation. Williamson (M&H, EO, EIS ) is the most 
prominent protagonist for the thesis that institutional forms 
other than markets may have significant implications for resource 
allocation questions. Finally, price may not be the only form of 
competition in practice. In conditions of bounded rationality, 
many other types of information may be significant, and indeed 
the role of price may be subverted or even swamped by the 
emergence of more dominant phenomena. A major theme of 
Schumpeter was the greater importance of technological 
competition compared to price competition, and this is an example 
of an area in which problems of variety, uncertainty, the very 
long run and bounded rationality are likely to rèduce or 
eliminate the role of price as the arbitreur of resource 
allocation.
Therefore, all five components of the neoclassical agenda 
have been attacked, albeit typically in guerilla fashion by 
discontented and disconnected groups of renegade economists 
sniping away at pieces of the neoclassical monolith. Attacking 
on all five fronts at once has not been attempted, perhaps wisely 
in view of lessons from the history of warfare. For example, 
Schumpeter still retains product-markets as basic units of 
analysis, while Cyert and Marchs behavioural theory of the firm 
(1963) retained four components of the neoclassical agenda - 
short run product market price - in what was otherwise a radical 



























































































The relationship between neoclassical theory and these 
guerilla groups is itself an interesting question which could 
usefully provide the basis for another paper. However in this 
paper we shall be concerned with exploring the claim that 
transaction cost economics is still strongly influenced by the 
five components of the neoclassical agenda, to its detriment. At 
first siyhc tuis might seem a surprising, even untenable, 
proposition. Innovation, non-optimal behaviour, the nature of 
resources, hierarchies and non-price information all figure more 
or less prominently in Williamson1s analysis. To suggest that the 
neoclassical agenda limits or distorts transaction cost economics 
appears obviously refuted by actual observation.
In fact we shall argue that transaction cost contains a 
deeper affinity with neoclassical theory than may be apparent 
from consideration of surface differences. This in turn leads to 
problems of analysis that limits its present applicability and 
relevance.
We shall analyse transaction cost economics from the point 
of view of each of the five items discussed above. In section 4, 
the roie of markets pruvides the starting point for markets 
versus hierarchies analysis. In section 5, the role of products 
in transaction cost analysis is analysed. Section 6 considers 
what, if anything, has been developed in transaction cost 
economics to replace the concept of optimality in decision 




























































































technological innovation in transaction cost economics is 
discussed in section 7. The role of price in transaction cost 
economics is considered in section 8, and the main arguments of 
the paper are then summarised in the final section, 9.
4. MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES
The issue of markets versus hierarchies lies at the heart of 
transaction cost economics and sets the context for our analysis 
of that framework. We shall briefly outline Williamson's 
approach before discussing problems and difficulties arising from 
his interpretation. As we shall see, this fundamental issue 
colours and influences the discussion of other points developed 
in later sections.
4.1 Williamson's treatment of hierarchy
"In the beginning there were markets" (EIS P.87).
Williamson deliberately uses this perspective as starting point 
to analyse the problem of parties to the transaction, "crafting, 
governance structures responsive to their contracting needs" (EIS 
P.87). Only when market problems such as transaction costs 
create pressures for internalisation might the transaction be 
removed from external market exchange (EIS P.87). Thus, "one of 
the attractive attributes of the transaction-cost approach is 
that it reduces, essentially, to a study of contracting" (EO 




























































































analysing hierarchy in contractual terms; "if one or a few agents 
are responsible for negotiating all contracts, the contractual 
hierarchy is great. If instead each agent negotiates each 
interface separately, the contractual hierarchy is weak" (EIS P. 
221). While Williamson acknowledges that hierarchy may also be 
analysed in decision-making terms (EIS P.221), it is the 
contractual interpretation of hierarchy which tends to infuse 
subsequent analysis of hierarchy in EIS. As we shall see in 
section 6, the role of decision-making tends to be neglected. 
Thus, contractual relations are analysable in terms of an 
exchange spectrum with pure market exchange at one extreme, 
centralised hierarchical organisation at the other, and hybrid 
forms such as franchising and joint ventures in between (EIS P 
83).
For parties to be joined in a contractual agreement requires 
non-separabilities to be relatively unimportant, a condition 
which Williamson has argued is a fairly general one ( M&H P. 49). 
Separabilities permit the development of an individualistic basis 
for the analysis of institutional forms and the incorporation of 
individual concepts like opportunism into the framework.
4.2 Implications of Williamson's treatment of hierarchy
The first difficulty to be attended to arising from 
Wiliamsonùs analysis is what is meant by transaction. It is not 




























































































be so obvious as to be self-explanatory. Instead the reader is 
referred to John R. Commons' argument that the transaction should 
be regarded as the basic unit of analysis, though what Commons 
meant by transaction is not precisely defined (M&H, PP3, 254; EIS 
PP 3,6).
Williamson does define transaction in EO, but his definition 
falls into two parts which are not necessarily mutually 
consistent:
"The costs of running the economic system to which 
Arrow refers can be usefully thought of in contractual 
terms. Each feasible mode of conducting relations 
between technologically-separable entities can be 
examined with respect to the ex ante costs of negotiating 
and writing, as well as the ex post costs of executing, 
policing, and when disputes arise, remedying the 
(explicit or implicit) contract that joins them.
A transaction may thus be said to occur when a good 
or service is transferred across a technologically- 
separable interface. One stage of processing or 
assembly activity terminates and another begins" (EO P 
139 ).
Arrows costs of running the economic system are transaction 
costs (EO P 136), and the first concept of transaction introduced 
above is a contractual or exchange based interpretation entirely 
consistent with Commons' definition; "actual transactions occur, 
of course between those who actually exchange products. The 
potential transactions are those which may or may not occur, 
since the parties are on the market and ready to exchange but do 




























































































However, the second definition of transaction as 
transferance across a technologically-separable interface is not 
necessarily the same thing at all. We can illustrate this with 
some examples, starting with a favourite fall back of economists, 
Robinson Crusoe.
Suppose Crusoe needs to have farming implements fashioned so 
that he can cultivate crops. The manufacture of implements and 
the cultivation of crops constitute technologically separable 
activities. The transferance of the tools from the fabrication 
stage to utilisation in agriculture is therefore a transaction 
according to Williamsons' second interpretation.
We assume Crusoe's sojourn passes through three phases. 
During the first phase he is alone and makes all his own tools as 
well as farming his own crops. For the second phase, Man Friday 
arrives, Crusoe enslaves him and instructs him to make tools to 
assist Crusoe in his farming. At the beginning of the third 
phase, Man Friday rebels and refuses to co-operate unless Crusoe 
teaches him how to read English. Man Friday gets English lessons 
and Crusoe gets tools.
The three phases can be characterized as those of autonomy, 
authority and exchange respectively. In each case transactions 
in the sense of transferring a product (tools) through 
technologically separable interfaces (from fabrication to use in 




























































































any evidence of Williamson's first definition of transaction as 
an agreement to exchange.
It is not difficult to conceive of other examples. Suppose, 
for example, we have three farmers whose farms are run by 
professional farm managers. The three farmers share co­
operative rights in a tractor. For simplicity, we assume the only 
contracts the farmers have to concern themselves with are the 
employment contracts for the respective farm managers and the 
terms and conditions under which each farmer can utilise the 
tractor.
Unfortunately the farmers are extremely opportunistic and 
the tractor contract proves highly expensive to all concerned; 
negotiating, policing and enforcing the contract takes up much 
time and wastes the resources of each of the parties. One farmer 
decides to buy out the other two; the overall effect is the 
switching of farm ownership and farm managers employment 
contracts to the farmer and the tearing up of the tractor co­
operative agreement. The tractor is allocated to farms in much 
the same fashion as before.
The net effect is therefore the elimination of the 
transaction in the contractual sense and the preservation of the 
transaction in the physical transferance sense. As in the first 
two phases of the Robinson Crusoe example, the two 




























































































this type are commonplace. Mergers to deal with transaction 
costs involved in such problems as cross licensing of R & D, 
joint venture agreements, vertical relationships may all be 
intended to eliminate the transaction in;the contractual sense 
but to preserve it in the physical sense. It is true that many 
of these may be expressable in internal market terms as in 
transfer pricing, but to presume that they automatically will be 
is to reduce the markets and hierarchies issue to external 
markets versus internal markets. In practice, autonomy and 
authority (fiat) may represent genuine alternatives to external 
markets and internal markets.
In fact, Williamson generally plumps for the contractual 
interpretation of transaction, as is obvious from the discussion 
in 4.1 above. This has a number of distorting effects on 
subsequent analysis. Both markets and■hierarchies are presumed 
analysable as exchange systems in which contracting parties have 
a fundamental propensity to behave opportunistically. This is 
evident in M & H in which the transactional properties of 
external markets are compared and contrasted with those of 
internal markets in labour, capital and intermediate products.
The concept of the firm as hierarchically organised is to some 
extent developed when the multidivisional form is discussed in 
chapter 8, but here the analysis is comparative only in so far as 
alternative hierarchies (U-form and M-form) are compared. Thus 
the comparative basis of Willialmson's analysis is really 




























































































hierarchy, not market versus hierarchy. Even the analysis of 
hierarchy becomes finally reducible to a question of markets when 
Williamson concludes the superior efficiency of the M-form is due 
to its ability to create an internal capital market.
Consequently, M & H is about markets, not markets and 
hierarchies. This perspective is carried to its logical 
conclusion in EIS where hierarchy itself is defined in 
contractual terms (see section 4.1 above).
The distorting effect of the market bias in transaction cost 
economics is also illustrated by Williamson's argument that; "the 
hazards of trading are less severe in Japan than in the United 
States because of cultural and institutional cheeks on 
opportunism" (EIS P 122). This interpretation of the Japanese 
system implicity assumes (a) individual opportunism is still the 
driving force in economic relation's, (b) culture operates only as 
constraint. This contrasts strongly with other analysts' 
observation of Japan's emphasis on "group rather than individual, 
on cooperation and conciliation aimed at harmony, on national 
rather than personal welfare" (Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976, P 53). 
In fact, Williamson does appear to observe these effects in his 
informal description of the Japanese system (EIS PP120-3), yet he 
argues that, "the same principles that inform make or buy 
decisions in the United States and in other Western countries 
also apply in Japan", (EIS P 122), with opportunism retaining its 
place centre stage. However to analyse all economic relationhips 




























































































and institutional myopia. Williamson associates 'obedience' 
with utopian literatures and social engineering, and dismisses it 
as involving the unwarranted assumption of "mechanistic 
orderliness" (EIS PP49-50). Yet as far as Japan is concerned, 
recurrent themes of group harmony as opposed to individualistic 
self-interest suggest that obedience would be a more reasonable 
behavioural assumption than is opportunism. This is not possible 
in Williamson's analysis since the substitution of opportunism 
with obedience would effectively pull the plug on the existing 
transaction cost framework, as is obvious from the discussion in 
section 2 above.
Williamson argues that transaction cost economics draws upon 
contributions from literature in economics, law and organisation 
(EIS PP11-14). However, there is a tendency to selectively draw 
upon organisational analysis that is consistent with the 
principle of individual opportunism, while the emphasis on 
exchange based systems is reinforced by the contracting 
perspective provided by the law literature. As we shall see in 
the following sections there are further problems of analysis 
associated with this frame of reference.
5. PRODUCTS AND DECOMPOSABILITY
3
The second item associated with the neoclassical agenda to 




























































































of decomposability. Individual consumers and individual product- 
markets form the basic building blocks of neoclassical theory. 
Assumptions of individualism and separability permit the 
introduction of convenient behavioural assumptions like 
individual self interest, and also allows higher level phenomena 
(firms, industries, markets, economies) to be treated as simple
4
aggregates of lower levels (products, consumers). We shall 
consider the influence of this perpective on the transaction cost 
framework before looking at problems of interpretation as far as 
one major issue is concerned, Williamson's explanation for the 
existence of conglomerates.
5.1 Decomposability in Transaction Cost Economics
The concept of separability is a consistent theme in 
transaction cost economics as well as neoclassical economics (M & 
H pp.49-51 ; EO pp.66,145-7, EIS pp.282-3). If decision making 
units can be regarded as separable, the problem can be decomposed 
into constituent parts. A number of important implications 
follow upon this presumption, some of which have been touched on 
already. Firstly, as we saw in section 4.2, it encourages an 
emphasis on individualistic notions like opportunism at the 
expense of social or cultural perspectives that may involve more 
complex system-wide effects. Secondly, separability is a pre­
condition of the creation of markets. If decision-making units 
can be treated as intrinsically separable, it is a simple step to 




























































































Problems arise when this is pushed to the extent of seeing 
virtually all relations in market exchange terms, as we saw with 
the analysis of hierarchy in section 4.2. Thirdly, and perhaps 
less obviously, it may lead to an overemphasis on asset- 
specificity. Concepts such as synergy (Ansoff 1965) and
5
economies of scope (Baumol et al, 1982) are based on the idea 
that resources are not necessarily specific to particular product 
markets, but can be shared, leading to economies in production. 
Such non-specificities may be central to issues such as 
diversification and multinational enterprise (Teece, 1980, 1986; 
Kay, 1982; Galbraith and Kay, 1986). However non-specificities 
complicate the treatment of product-markets as independent, 
separable, units of analysis, and so there is a natural tendency 
for transaction cost economics to emphasise asset-specificity at 
the expense of non-specificity.
Fourthly, and related to the previous point, Williamson applies 
his framework to those systems in which product-markets can be 
treated as separable and independent to a considerable extent.
For example, the basic product-markets analysed in M & H are 
intermediate product markets and the conglomerate. In the former, 
the product-market is treated in isolation, in the latter the 
unrelated basis of corporate diversification means that the 
different product-markets can be treated as separable profit 
centres. Intermediate cases of diversified firms linked by 




























































































effectively excluded from discussion, and the omission is not 
rectified in EO or EIS.
Williamson in fact provides a transaction cost analysis of 
the conglomerate which he argues accounts for its evolution and 
development. However we shall argue below that his explanation 
is not satisfactory, and that ironically it may be better 
regarded as an argument for corporate specialisation rather than 
conglomerateness.
5.2 Conglomerateness and Transaction Costs
Williamson (M & H pp. 155-75, EO pp.154-8, EIS pp.286-8) 
provides an explanation for the existence of conglomerates based 
upon M-form principles and failures in the external capital 
market. As such it appears to offer a means of resolving the 
apparent paradoxical existence of firms operating unrelated 
product-markets with no obvious synergy benefits.
Williamson argues that the conglomerate may constitute a 
miniature capital market superior in performance to the external 
capital market. Firstly, internalisation of the capital market 
might enhance the quality and quantity of information available 
to providers of funds and give more direct control over auditing 
and the rewarding/penalising of performance. The advantages of 





























































































Secondly, divisionalisation encourages creation of profit 
centres as basic elements in an M-form (multi-division) 
structure. Divisionalised profit centres organised around 
product, territory or process may allow the creation of an 
internal capital market within the firm. Divisions can be 
assessed in terms of profit contribution; the development of this 
uniform, measurable standard facilitates divisional comparability 
and may have beneficial incentive effects on managers.
Williamson argues that the combination of internalisation 
and divisionalisation advantages permits the conglomerate to 
operate as a miniature capital market with associated attractive 
efficiency advantages. This is offered as a rationale for the 
conglomerate.
In fact, there is nothing wrong with the argument when it is 
offered in terms of why the conglomerate may be more efficient 
than the external capital market. Consistent with the general 
internal markets versus external markets orientation of M & H, 
this is how the analysis is developed. The idea that capital 
market failure may encourage internalisation and 
divisionalisation is persuasive.
The problems arise when this is offered as a rationale for 
the conglomerate. In this context, Williamson is comparing the 
wrong things. Instead of analysing why the conglomerate may be 




























































































economics has to explain why it may be superior to the 
specialised firm. By Williamson's own chosen criterion of 
efficiency, there must be some advantage that conglomerateness 
has over specialisation that encourages this strategy to evolve 
at the expense of the specialised firm. Unfortunately, the 
internalisation/divisionalisation thesis contains no such 
advantage. We can illustrate this with reference to a simple 
example.
Suppose we start off with a grouping of 9 independent firms 
- say 3 aerospace, 3 chemical and 3 electronics. The firms have 
all been facing capital market problems; possibly because the 
growth of the respective firms has tended to encourage separation 
of ownership and control (this is consistent with Williamson's 
analysis of the growth of specialised U-form or functionally 
organised firms; M & H pp.133-6). The firms can all be 
characterised in terms of lazy, incompetent managers wasting 
existing funds and being unable to attract new funds.
Creation of a miniature capital market could contribute 
towards the mitigation of some of these effects, and Williamson's 
internalisation/divisionalisation argument is helpful in 
explaining how this might be achieved. Amalgamation of firms by 
merger or takeover is an obvious device for this purpose.
However Williamson's internalisation/divisionalisation 




























































































should be adopted. Suppose one strategy would involve the 
amalgamation and divisionalisation of the three electronics 
firms, while a second would involve a combination of 3 firms, one 
from each sector. Both strategies could create internal capital 
markets and separate independent profit centres around the former 
corporate boundaries. Both the specialised electronics-based 
strategy and conglomerate strategy could extract the miniature 
capital market advantages associated with the multidivisional 
forms. In these respects at least, there is nothing to choose 
between them.
However, this apparent neutrality of efect is superficial. 
When the specialisation/conglomerate choice is examined further, 
there are in fact sound transaction cost reasons why the 
specialised strategy would appear to be generally superior.
These relate to problems of performance comparability and the 
possibility of internal trading, respectively.
Firstly, similarity in technology and markets between 
divisions facilitates profit comparison between divisions and may 
improve the profit centre operation of the internal capital 
market, as Williamson recognises (EIS p.140). In principle it is 
easier to infer efficiency from performance within sectors than 
it is between sectors.
Secondly, if there are complementary markets or technologies 




























































































electronics case, these may open up the possibility of internal 
trades or deals to exploit synergistic possibilities. The 
independence of the divisional profit centres need not be 
compromised, but the existence of internal senior management 
"umpires" may reduce the internal transaction costs of such deals 
compared to external options such as leasing, joint venture or 
licensing. In particular, opportunistic behaviour may be more 
easily rectified or prevented. The same transaction cost 
arguments used to justify the internal capital market can also be 
utilised in considering other internal markets involving inter- 
divisional transfers of informational human or physical 
resources. Williamson's own transaction cost tool-kit provides 
arguments for specialisation rather than conglomerateness. In 
short, there is no advantage that may be provided by the 
conglomerate in Williamson's analysis that could not also be 
provided by more specialised strategies. In addition, 
specialisation may provide additional efficiency gains over 
conglomerates. Consequently, Williamson does not explain why the 
conglomerate should evolve in preference to alternative corporate 
strategies.
In fact, the conglomerate is a relatively rare phenomena 
even among large firms (Rumelt, 1974; Channon, 1973, Dyas and 
Thanheiser 1976). What is missing from Williamson's analysis are 
positive reasons for choice of conglomerateness rather than 
specialisation in the cases where it does obtain. An alternative 




























































































specialisation dangers; as well as providing synergies and 
economies, specialisation may provide vulnerability to 
environmental threats in turbulent, rapidly changing and 
uncertain environments. The conglomerate strategy is one option 
that may be adopted by corporate management in such 
6
circumstances. Management avoid market and technological 
linkages, not for internal efficiency gains but because they do 
not wish to tie their fate and the fate of the firm to a limited 
set of market and technological opportunities.
We shall conclude this section by emphasizing two points. 
Firstly, Williamson's emphasis on separability and individualism 
is consistent with the resultant focussing on the extreme case of 
the conglomerate in which the firm can be regarded as a highly 
decomposable system. However, even when it is similarly analysed 
in terms of decomposability around profit centres the specialised 
strategy appears potentially superior in efficiency terms to the 
conglomerate, ceteris paribus. In practice it may be that 
autonomy and fiat may augment or replace internal markets, 
hierarchy may provide an effective alternative to inter- 
divisional exchange agreements; the point here is that 
Williamson's argument is not convincing even on its own 
(contractual) terms.
Secondly, another consideration briefly touched on here will 




























































































of the environment. We have already seen that it is not possible 
to justify diversification in general and conglomerateness in 
particular by reference to internal efficiency considerations 
alone. Instead environmental considerations are likely to be 
important. In the next section we shall extend consideration of 
the role of the environment to transaction cost analysis of the 
evolution of the multi-divisional (M-form) structure.
6. DECISION-MAKING AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Tne third item on the neoclassical agenda to influence the 
development of the transaction cost framework is the concept of 
optimality. The relationship between optimality and decision­
making is not as obvious as might seem at first sight. While 
maximising behaviour may appear an obvious starting point from 
which to explore questions of optimality it is not essential; for 
example if the environment is stable and learning opportunities 
exist, satisficing decision-makers may converge on the maximising 
solution (Day, 1967).
Nevertheless, maximising has been a convenient decision­
making base for neoclassical explorations. A related topic has 
been the role of competition as an environmental phenomenon 
encouraging or forcing efficient maximising behaviour. Decision­
making and the environment are closely connected issues in 
neoclassical theory. Below we shall consider how transaction 




























































































implications for one major issue analysed by Williamson, the 
evolution of the M-form corporation.
6.1 Decision-making and the Environment in Transaction Cost 
Economics
Williamson's development of transaction cost economics does 
not really develop a theory of decision-making and neglects the 
role of environment. We shall consider both these points in 
turn.
Neoclassical theory has maximising criteria, behavioural and 
evolutionary theory have occasionally drawn upon the concept of 
satisficing. However, there is no corresponding principle or 
criteria for decision-making in Williamson's development of 
transaction cost economics. Instead efficiency criteria are 
assumed to win out in the end with no real analysis of the 
process by which efficiency decisions are made. Given the 
emphasis on the opportunistic individual as basic to analysis, 
the neglect of how such an individual makes a decision is 
particularly striking. Yet despite this neglect, a theme of 
Williamson's development has been emphasis on market versus 
organisational failure (eg. see EIS pp. 153). However, if we are 
being consistent in pursuing a comparative analysis, 
institutional performance would be relative rather than definable 
in terms of some absolute decision-making standard. Comparison 




























































































to talk of institutional success as the other side of tne coin 
from failure. Defining performance in institutional failure 
terms implies some absolute standard lurking in the background, 
and it is tempting to identify this as the concept of optimality. 
This interpretation is given some weight by the optimality 
standard occasionally being made explicit, as in the case of the 
M-form hypothesis (M & H, p.150).
The second area of neglect, the nature and impact of the 
environment, is encouraged to the extent that the analysis is 
framed in comparative institutional terms. We can demonstrate 
this with an example of the transaction cost economics approach.
Suppose the firm has to produce 0 of a particular product 
and the objective is to minimise costs. If neoclassical 
conditions nord as far as competition in product, capital and 
factor jnarkets is concerned, and there are no bounded rationality 
problems, then neoclassical production costs S may be expressed 
as
S = P K + P L 
. k L
where K is capital and L is labour and P and P are their
K L
respective prices. Now,'suppose production can be organised two 
ways; a firm can carry out all production inhouse, or two firms 




























































































resources to produce Q (e.g. through licencing, joint venture or 
sub-contracting). The first option involves organisation costs, 
the second may substitute some of the hierarchical costs with 
transaction costs. The choice may be now expressed as;
Choose lesser cost alternative where cost C;
C = S + f(E)
where f(E) represents the additional costs associated with 
respective forms of economic organisation. Since S represents 
identical base costs whatever the form of economic organisation, 
the appropriate decision is whether f(E) is greater or less under 
the market or hierarchial alternative.
Williamson emphasises that transaction cost economics is 
mainly concerned with assessment of distinct institutional 
alternatives (EO, pp.14o & 187) and our formulation above 
illustrates the typical decision problem that is associated with 
such analysis. Problems such as multinational enterprise \/s 
licensing, diversification vs joint venture, vertical integration 
vs intermediate product markets, inhouse v£ sub-contracting, and 
mergers v£ market contracts can all be represented in similar 
fashion. There are two advantages that such a formulation 
provides. The first is that we can ignore neoclassical 
production costs since they are common to all institutional 
choices and so the question can be limited to which institutional 




























































































is that demand considerations can be ignored for similar reasons. 
The analysis can therefore concentrate solely on the costs of 
governance internal to the respective systems by assuming that 
demand conditions and neoclassical production are the same for 
all institutional choices. It is very much a supply side 
analysis, though there is no real discussion of who makes 
decisions and how they are made.
However, reduction of the analysis to questions of 
governance is carried out at the expense of environmental 
considerations such as the role of competition and the demand 
mechanism. This perspective can lead to incompleteness of 
analysis as we shall see in the next section.
6.2 The Evolution of the M-Form Corporation
The evolution of the M-form corporation has been a major 
area of study in transaction cost economics (M & H, pp.132-54, EO 
pp. 65-77, 151-4, EIS, pp. 279-94). As well as providing a basis 
for analysis of the economics of internal organisation,
Williamson has extended this analysis into investigation of 
conglomerate diversification and multinational enterprise.
However we suggest here that there are problems with existing 
transaction cost explanations due to the ignoring of 
environmental questions. According to Williamson, U-form firms, 
that is those organised by functional specialism such as R & D, 




























































































loss and strategy formulating problems as they expand in terms of 
size and diversity. Since all problems involving more than one 
function have to be co-ordinated and decided on at senior 
management level, centralisation of decisions results in a high 
level of organisation costs. Centralisation creates control loss 
problems by requiring information to pass through numerous levels 
before it is acted on; congestion and limited capacity, as far as 
information processing at senior management level is concerned, 
exacerbates these problems. Short run urgent operating crises 
may push out long run strategic decision making at this level.
If senior management attempt to ease the information capacity 
problem by involving functional heads in top level decision 
making, pursuit of sub-goals by these functional heads may 
distort the profit orientation of the corporation. For these 
reasons there may be severe efficiency problems accompanying the 
growth and expansion of the U-form corporation.
Williamson argues the M-forrn, divisionalised corporation 
mitigates these problems. By giving divisions responsibility for 
inter-functional operating problems, control loss problems are 
reduced since most decisions can be taken lower down the system. 
Top management are freed to concentrate on longer run strategic 
problems, while the creation of divisional profit centres may 
facilitate the creation of an internal capital market, as we saw 
in section 5.2.




























































































analysis of the relative superiority of M-forin versus U-form for 
the large diversified corporation. The problems lie with 
Williamson's analysis of the evolution from U-form to M-form, 
following on Chandler's earlier analysis (1966).
Williamson argues that the expansion of the U-form leads to 
efficiency problems such as control loss and managerial 
discretion. The M-form provided a more efficient solution than 
either the U-form, or the holding company (H-form) alternative 
which lacked the selective strategic intervention mechanisms of 
the U-form. Consequently "in the degree to which the M-form is 
in fact the fitter, natural selection, which includes competition 
in the capital market, favors this result." (EIS; p.296).
The problem with this interpretation is that it puts the 
cart before the horse. Natural selection filters out inferior 
forms by creating inefficiency problems as a consequence of 
competition from superior forms. These problems typically become 
manifest after the appearance of the superior form, not before.
As Alchian points out; "even in a world of stupid men there 
would still be profits" (1950, p.213). The technologically 
inferior slide rule was still a viable commercial proposition 
until after the introduction of electronic calculators. The 
helpless dodo survived in an isolated and benign environment 
until the arrival of an aggressive predator, man. Import 




























































































efficient, foreign competition and even allow it to be 
profitable. Natural selection selects present competitors, not 
future competitors. Since the M-form had not been introduced at 
the point during the inter-war period when many U-form 
corporations were experiencing crises that apparently led to the 
introduction of the M-form, (pp.348-9) it cannot be held 
accountable for these crises. In those circumstances, 
Williamson's identification of control loss and managerial 
discretion problems in the U-form as "the basic reason why the 
(M-form) corporation became necessary" (Williamson, 1971, p.348) 
is unconvincing. His interpretation of natural selection 
processes may explain adoption and diffusion of the M-form once 
introduced (EO, p.164) but not its initial development. All the 
managerial discretion and control loss problems analysed by 
Williamson (1971 ) are internally generated problems, but 
competition and natural selection works by creating externally 
generated problems in the systems environment. The logical 
conclusion of Williamson's analysis is that, "eventually 
(expansion of) the U-form structure defeats itself" (italics 
added) and results in the M-form innovation to solve these 
problems (1971, p.350). The inappropriate idea of self defeating 
systems is a consequence of ignoring competitive forces in 
evolving economic systems.
Williamson does not really develop the natural selection 
argument, but if we pursue this line of enquiry it might suggest 




























































































start be restating Alchian's earlier comment as implying "Even in 
a world of inefficient U-form corporations there would still be 
profits." If the U-form corporations are experiencing crises, 
why? Williamson points out that transitory market conditions 
often triggered the M-form innovaton, but comes back to 
managerial discretion and control loss problems as the major 
source of problems (1971, p.348). At this point we are stuck 
until we have some knowledge of the environmental conditions that 
are stimulating such crises. If it is simply that smaller firms 
are more efficient and more successful because U-forms have 
overexpanded, then this is an argument for limiting scale and/or 
growth, an argument recognised and discussed in a pre-transaction 
cost article, (Williamson 1967, reprinted EO chapter 3, but not 
mentioned in the context of the development of the M-form 
corporation). If it is the case that expanded U-forms are more 
efficient that their smaller more specialised brethren, they 
would still be one eyed men in the kingdom of the blind, prior to 
the emergence of two eyed M-forms. In fact, this'latter 
interpretation is more reasonable in a transaction cost 
framework, otherwise we have to treat the overexpanded U-form 
development associated with the former interpretation as 
consistently irrational. However it we choose this route, it is 
not clear what crises could be provoked by U-form organisation 
since it is, at this stage, the only game in town.
The question is in fact an empirical one, but one in which 




























































































arguments are likely to be helpful, but care has to be taken with 
their formulation.
A final point regarding the U-form/M-form issue is that 
although a theory of decision-making is not adequately developed 
in transaction cost economics, Williamson does suggest; "to the 
extent that the coincidence of large, unitary form structures and 
nontrivial opportunity sets (mainly by reason of favorable market 
conditions) is observed in the economy, utility maximizing 
behaviour (and its attendant consequences) is to be expected (M & 
H, p.150f)". He argues that this allows his earlier analysis of 
managerial discretion theory in the context of U-form 
organisation to be applied in such cases.
In fact such integration of managerial discretion theory and 
transaction cost economics is not feasible; if utility maximising 
behaviour is possible then so also is profit-maximising, since 
the profit maximising outcome is a special case in all of the 
variety of managerial utility models put forward in Williamson 
7
(1964). The reason that managers do not profit maximise is not 
because they cannot, but because they do not wish to. There are 
other components of their utility function. The reason they are 
allowed to do so is because of information problems in the 
capital market. However, there are no information problems of




























































































managers have the ability to maximise profits, if they so choose. 
There are no bounds on their rationality.
If Williamson1s earlier managerial discretion theory was 
really applicable to overexpanded U-forms as he suggests, then it 
removes the foundatons of his transaction cost economics. Given 
there are no informational problems of internal organisation in 
managerial discretion theory, the M-form innovation would be 
introduced to solve a non-existent problem, the analysis of the 
M-form only makes sense if there are severe problems of bounded 
rationality and information processing within the overexpanded U- 
form. The absence of these problems in managerial discretion 
theory leaves nothing for the M-form to do. Consequently, rather 
than augmenting transaction cost explanations of the evolution of 
the modern corporation, managerial discretion theory negates 
them. They are inconsistent and incompatible approaches between 
which a choice has to be made. The balance of argument probably 
does lie in favour of transaction cost economics, which means 
explicitly rejecting Williamson's earlier managerial discretion 
theory.
7. THE SHORT RUN, THE LONG RUN AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
As Williamson implies, transaction cost economics is 
probably more applicable to the long run rather than the short 
run ( EIS, p.23). Time is required to switch resources from one 




























































































However, Williamson ( 1986 )(b ) implies that the very long run is 
an area which transaction cost economics may find difficult to 
deal with, since most of the contracting issues of concern to 
transaction cost economics are of shorter duration. Despite the 
importance of technological innovation, its treatment in EIS is 
sparse (pp.141-44, with occasional mentions elsewhere). M & H 
devoted a chapter to technological change, but the analysis is 
really a review paper of existing studies. Innovation is not 
really properly assimilated into the transaction cost framework.
Williamson is aware of the difficulties and suggests that 
further study of the relations between organisation and 
innovation is needed. However there have been many such studies 
in recent years; it could be suggested that what is needed is an 
adequate conceptual framework to aid interpretation of this 
issue. The market bias in transaction cost economics discussed 
in section 4 makes this difficult. The long time horizons and 
high degrees of uncertainty associated with innovation creates 
substantial problems for any contractual arrangement, explicit or 
implicit.
Interestingly Williamson suggests "the role of competition 
in sorting out innovations according to their economic merit also 
warrants more complete treatment. The link to evolutionary 
economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982) will be especially 
instructive" (EIS p.404). Williamson is referring to 




























































































easily extended to technological innovations. Usefully, 
evolutionary economics has a perspective based around the role of 
environment and the nature of resources that may provide a 
corrective to the supply based product oriented transaction cost 
approach. Also, the absence of a theory of search in transaction 
cost economics follows its neglect of decision making; the two 
issues are closely related. Evolutionary economics provides 
bases for analysis of decision-making and search that may 
generate useful clues as to how transactional cost economics 
could be modified in these respects, especially with respect to 
technological innovation.
At this point Williamson's approach is still effectively 
limited to the static technology long run on the neoclassical 
agenda, problems of the very long run being difficult to 
assimilate. However, these are hints as to how reformulation 
might be achieved that may better suit the framework as for as 
dealing with problems of technological change is concerned.
8. PRICE AND INFORMATION
The last item on the neoclassical agenda that has influenced 
the development of transaction cost economics is price. 
Neoclassical theory revolves around the price mechanism as a 
resource allocating mechanism. In principle, transaction cost 
economics leaves price theory behind by revealing that many other 




























































































considerations are considered. In practice, price still plays a 
central role in the transaction cost economics of M & H, EO and 
EIS. Williamson synthesises the core of transaction cost 
arguments in EIS around a contractual scheme in which technology 
and governance systems are distinguishable in terms of the price 
associated with the respective systems (EIS pp.32-35). The basic 
scheme is applied repeatedly to transaction cost problems 
throughout the work. Price still serves as a major classifcatory 
and analytical device in transaction cost economics.
Such an emphasis is understandable given the explicitly 
contractual basis of Williamson's transaction cost economics. 
Contracts suggest markets which naturally evoke the concept of 
price as a device for facilitating exchange. However, even in 
markets, price may play a relatively subordinate role in terms of 
desired or required information when bounded rationality problems 
are significant. When non-market relations are being
8
investigated, price may not even be a consideration. Its 
significance or implications, if any, may be swamped by the 
crackle and noise emanating from other major information 
problems.
Although Williamson argues that transaction cost economics 
builds upon contributions from organisation studies, little 
reference is made to recent work in this area. In fact there 




























































































theorists which suggest that traditional interpretations of the 
role of information in organisations require to be radically 
revised (March and Shapira, 1982). The role of information is 
more complex than was earlier supposed by theorists who treated 
it simply as an input into efficient decision making.
Information both influences and is influenced by social system in 
complex organisations. March and Shapira cite evidence to 
suggest that most information is gathered for surveillance and 
monitoring purposes, not to make decisions, and that the value of 
information even in decision-making is linked more to the process 
rather than the substance of decision-making; given non- 
decomposability of performance measures as far as decision-makers 
are concerned, a decision-maker is likely to be judged in terms
9
of technique rather than effect. Information may serve more as 
symbol and reinforcement of authority and hierarchical position 
than as input into efficient decision-making (March and Shapira 
pp.97-9). For transaction cost economists interested in how 
alternative institutional forms handle and process information, 
the March and Shapira survey suggests new directions which 
10
analysis could take.
The role of price in the transaction cost economics of M &
H, E0 and EIS echoes the preoccupation of neoclassical economics 
with markets and exchange relations. There is a need to modify 
the remit to properly analyse institutions as social systems in 




























































































allowed for in price theoretic approaches. Price does not 
deserve its central role in transaction cost economics.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The five items of the neoclassical agenda have provided a 
useful basis for analysing the development of transaction cost 
economics up to this point. The major argument here is that 
transaction cost economics has encountered failures of analysis 
when considered on its own terms as an attempt to develop a 
comparative institutional approach to problems in economic 
organisation. However the mood of this paper is optimistic in so 
far as there already exist useful signposts and clues as to how 
reformulation can take place. Williamson has provided an 
extremely valuable tool kit which may be augmented by the work of 
other analysts.
The deficiencies of the transaction cost framework to date 
are rooted in the market bias of the approach. The contracting 
basis of transaction cost economics leads to an emphasis on 
markets, external and internal, and it has been argued here that 
it leads to a neglect or distortion of hierarchy and its effects. 
In fact, markets are very rare and occasional devices, most 
resource allocation being decided under conditions of autonomy or
11




























































































in principle decomposable into markets does not mean to say they 
necessarily will be.
The bias is reinforced by the presumption that in the 
beginning there were markets. We could as reasonably presume
1 2
that in the beginning there were firms , though this runs the 
danger of replacing a market bias with a hierarchical one. The 
individualistic orientation of such exchange based analysis also 
leads to pushing the concept of decomposability farther than is 
perhaps justified. Presuming that the world is decomposable into 
individual products means that the importance of non-specific 
assets in corporate resource allocation is obscured, and also 
leads to analytical problems as in the case of the explanation of 
the existence of the conglomerate. The contracting basis of 
transaction cost analysis also leads to an emphasis on short/long 
run neoclassical conditions of static technology at the expense 
of considerations of technological innovation, (exacerbated by 
the absence of a theory of search), and an overemphasis on price 
rather than other types of information. In an era of large 
diversified multinational corporations, neoclassical economists' 
faith that resource allocation questions can be satisfactorly 
resolved by examining price signals is rather like an 
anthropologist believing that Apache tribal relationships could 
be unravelled by monitoring their smoke signals. Transaction 
cost economics offers a means of escaping this trap, but it is 




























































































opening the Russian doll of external markets only reveals another 
Russian doll of internal markets. The analysis of decision­
making also goes by default, efficiency considerations being 
presumed to win out without sufficient analysis of how this will 
be achieved.
There are three major areas of focus that transaction cost 
economics should adopt now, each of them intended to compensate 
for the market bias in the present forumulation of the approach.
Firstly, it may be more helpful in many circumstances to 
analyse the firm as a combination of resources rather than as an 
aggregation of products. Penrose (1959) and Nelson and Winter 
(1982) are indicative of how economic analysis can be developed 
in this respect.
Secondly, processes of decision making should be explicitly 
incorporated in transaction cost analysis with attention being 
paid to the associated problems of search, selection and the role 
of the environment. The volume by Ungson and Braunstein 
( 1 982 )reviewing recent findings in behavioural decision making, 
human problem solving and organisational decision making provides 
useful outlines of the state of the art in these areas, the 
chapter by March and Shapira being particularly interesting.
Earl (1984) also provides helpful analysis of corporate strategy 
and decision making. Also evolutionary theory (Nelson and 




























































































Thirdly, the role of hierarchy, organisation and structure 
should be developed in the analysis. Market holds centre stage 
just now with hierarchy lurking offstage, but it should not be 
too difficult to push the latter on, with a little prompting from 
13
organization studies.
We may borrow an image from Dickens and conjure up a ghost 
of Christmas yet-to-come for transaction cost economics if such 
cautions are ignored. The ghost haunts Baumols' (1986) review 
article of EIS where he suggests that the production function may 
be generalized to include governance expenses, with governance 
regarded as a necessary requirement of production. Once this is 
accomplished, we should "aspire to the beginnings of a theory of 
optimality in governance structure along with some comparative 
static analysis indicating how changes in values of some of the 
pertinent parameters affect the optimal structure" p.286. Baumol 
suggests that much could be learnt by analogy with standard 
welfare theory and that governance problems are reducible to 
problems in price theory; "there is every reason to expect that 
precisely analogous problems affect governance by price mechanism 
within the firm and that precisely analogous price modifications
14
will sometimes serve the firm as well" 8p.286).
The spectre of transaction cost economics taking the hand of 
contestable markets theory down the moribund road of reheated
1 5




























































































Ebenezer Scrooge discovered, life is about choices, and we may 
take some comfort from the lack of inevitability in this vision. 























































































































































































This was written while on leave of absence from Heriot- 
Watt University as Jean Monnet Fellow in the Law 
Department, European University Institute, 1986-87.
Thanks to Paul Hare, Geoff Wyatt, Frank Stephen, Gunther 
Teubner, Donald George for helpful comments, and of course 
general absolution to all of them from any responsibility 
for my mistakes or failings of analysis in what follows. 
Thanks also to Gail Strom and Joyce Reese for 
constructing order out of disorder in their production of 
this paper.
These different frameworks cover a wide area and each 
framework often contains significant internal differences 
of interpretation. For some discussion of the different 
approaches and references to related literature, see Kay 
(1984).
Williamson recognises that transaction cost economics 
would benefit from more sociological input (EIS p.17) 
that, in fact, the concept of power is underdeveloped 
(EIS, p.272) and that the framework should respond to 
lessons from organisation theory (EIS, p.402). However, 
these remarks do not influence the central tenet of the 
framework, that it is a contractual analysis based on 
exchange relations.
Kay (1984) discusses in some detail problems arising from 
the assumption of extreme decomposability.
Although the contestable markets literature tends not to 
refer to the earlier analysis of synergy in the corporate 
strategy literature, economies of scope are the same as 
synergy, that is, they derive from resource sharing 
between product-markets. Asset non-specifity therefore 
underlies economies of scope. Williamson (1986b) 
recognises the different starting points of contestable 
markets and transaction costs economics.
In some circumstances, there may be only limited 
opportunities for further operation in present markets and 
technologies because of the highly specialised and 
idiosyncratic nature of the resources. Market saturation 
or possible antitrust action against further growth by 
specialisation may require any additional growth be 




























































































7. Optimality depends on perspective. There may be optimal 
outcomes from the point of view of the decision-makers, 
but not necessarily from the point of view of society.
8. Shadow price and opportunity cost considerations may exist 
even in non-market relations such as Crusoe's early 
sojourn on his island. The point here is that price is 
only one small piece of information out of many in 
circumstances involving severe problems of bounded 
rationality.
9 . It is tempting to argue that this may help to account for 
the sustainability of the technique dominated neoclassical 
theory, though such a suggestion might be taken as a bit 
of a sideswipe.
10. March and Shapira also argue that organisations recognise 
the problem of "tainted" information, that is resulting 
from strategic misrepresentation for personal or subgroup 
reasons (p.98). This may provide interesting links with 
opportunistic behaviour in transaction cost economics.
11. For example, an individual in the normal course of 
everyday life makes many resource allocation decisions, 
only a few being decided by recourse to contract. Even 
for those decided in the context of contract (e.g., in 
employment), the decision and subsequent action itself 
may be influenced by many considerations other than 
commitments involved in the employment contract.
12. Giovanni Dosi has argued this point in seminar 
discussions.
13. Also, some analysis of how economic analysis could be 
integrated with hierarchical considerations is developed 
in Kay (1979, 1982, 1984 Chapter 6).
14. Baumol misrepresents Williamson's concept of opportunism 
when he defines it as simply "willingness to profit at the 
expense of others" (p.280). This appears no different 
from simpler concepts of self-interest seeking in 
traditional literatures. Williamson takes considerable 
pains to differentiate the concept of opportunism from 
these simpler concepts.
15. Comparable spectres appear in Rugmans (1981) 
interpretation of the multinational as an internal pricing 
mechanism and Caves (1982) analysis of multinationals in 
which he proceeds to outline optimal public policy 
guidelines using neoclassical principles and building on 
transaction cost arguments. Both recognise transaction 
cost problems encourage internalisation of markets, but 
still presume that standard price theory can be obviously 
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